The Fantasy of Multi Domain and Combined Arms Rhetoric in Western Circles
In contemporary Western military discussions, the terms “combined arms” and its successor, “multi-domain operations,” are ubiquitous. They are presented as the pinnacle of tactical and strategic thought, the keys to unlocking victory on the modern battlefield. This constant repetition, however, serves less as a guide to effective warfare and more as an exercise in institutional marketing and obfuscation. A critical examination reveals these concepts to be arrogant, jargon-laden frameworks that obscure the primacy of material force, mischaracterize the nature of conflict, and are potentially counter-productive to genuine military readiness.
The Illusion of Synergy
The foundational concept of combined arms is typically illustrated with a simple, textbook scenario: infantry, armor, and artillery working in concert to overcome a fortified enemy. The argument is that these elements, when synchronized, create a synergistic effect where the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. This presentation is fundamentally misleading. The act of bringing tanks, air support, and artillery to bear on an infantry position is not a display of intricate tactical synergy; it is an application of disproportionately larger hardware and resources. It is, in its essence, brute force.
This framing masks the reality that such an engagement is heavily skewed in favor of the side with overwhelming material superiority. The concept’s effectiveness in this idealized form hinges on the crucial, and often unstated, assumption that the adversary is incapable of mounting a similar combined arms response. When facing a near-peer competitor who can also field integrated armor, artillery, and air assets, the elegant calculus of synergy collapses back into a grim arithmetic of attrition and material advantage. The narrative of synergy becomes a way to romanticize overwhelming force, disguising it as intellectual superiority.
The Rebranding of Standard Operations
The evolution of this thinking into “multi-domain operations” extends this flawed logic into new arenas. Proponents posit that land, sea, air, space, and cyberspace are distinct domains of warfare that must be seamlessly integrated. This again creates a false impression of novelty. Functions such as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), disruption of enemy operations through electronic means, and an understanding of logistical chains are not new concepts. They are standard, essential components of military operations that have existed for generations.
Attaching the label “multi-domain” to these functions is an attempt to present them as something grander and more revolutionary than they are. Space-based assets are tools for ISR and communication; cyber operations are a modern form of sabotage and intelligence gathering. To categorize them as independent “domains” of warfare is a semantic inflation. It is a linguistic exercise designed to project an image of forward-thinking sophistication, when in reality it is merely rebranding existing support functions. This serves institutional ends, creating new bureaucracies and justifying budgets, but it does not fundamentally change the nature of the tasks themselves.
A Distraction from Material Reality
Perhaps the most damaging aspect of this doctrinal obsession is its potential to be counter-productive. While defense establishments invest time and resources in developing and disseminating complex jargon, near-peer adversaries are focused on a more tangible goal: building and fielding superior military systems. In a contest against a powerful state, victory will not be determined by the elegance of a doctrinal whitepaper. It will be determined by the range and lethality of missiles, the stealth and capability of fighter jets, and the sheer productive capacity of the industrial base.
The focus on “multi-domain operations” can become a dangerous distraction, a conceptual band-aid applied to cover deficiencies in hardware. It fosters a belief that a cleverer doctrine can compensate for a material disadvantage. This is a comforting illusion but a perilous one. If an adversary’s fighter jet is more capable, or their anti-ship missiles can out-range our own, no amount of synergistic thinking will alter that physical reality on the battlefield. The intellectual energy spent bickering over jargon could be better used to address the stark, material challenges required to at least match, if not exceed, the capabilities of potential opponents.
Unconventional Thought, Not Doctrinal Dogma
Proponents of these doctrines often point to historical examples, such as the German victory over France in 1940, as proof that a superior doctrine can defeat a superior force. This, too, is a misreading of history. The German breakthrough was not the result of a perfectly polished and pre-packaged “combined arms doctrine.” It was the result of a single, radical, and unconventional thought: that the tank was not merely an infantry support weapon but a powerful, independent instrument of breakthrough.
The French did not fail to defend the Ardennes forest because of an inferior doctrine of combined arms; they failed because their existing doctrine deemed the region impassable for a large armored force. The German success was not born of a better manual, but from the exploitation of a tactical opportunity that was only visible to those who had broken with conventional military thought. The German command structure did not need a new, overarching doctrine to proceed; it needed to listen to the few unconventional thinkers who saw a new way to use a new tool.
The modern obsession with creating a holistic, all-encompassing doctrine like “multi-domain operations” risks creating the very institutional rigidity it claims to oppose. It attempts to bottle the lightning of unconventional thought and turn it into a sterile, repeatable process. This is the ultimate arrogance: the belief that strategic genius can be proceduralized and taught through PowerPoint slides, when history consistently shows that victory often belongs to those who are willing to shatter the existing procedures. The focus should not be on enforcing a new dogma, but on fostering an environment where radical ideas can challenge the old ones.