Why MLRS Is Making Conventional Artillery Obsolete
The performance of land-based firepower in modern warfare depends on three key pillars: munition lethality, platform survivability, and the resilience of logistical chains. This article analyzes why conventional tube artillery faces systemic and profound challenges in modern high-intensity battlespace.
The first part of this analysis compares resupply mechanisms. It argues that conventional artillery resupply is inherently fragile, exposing platforms to steep risks. Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (MLRS), in contrast, have much more resilient resupply.
The second part builds on this resupply vulnerability. It extends this weakness to broader operational risks. It explores the concepts of emplacement-displacement times and tempo/salvo size. It defines a new metric “impact per unit of risk” based on the risk profile and lethality of platforms and shows how MLRS are superior. When facing a peer or near-peer adversary, traditional artillery (especially towed and less advanced self-propelled variants) are no longer at the cutting edge of military capability. In fact, they are untenable and too vulnerable to be useful.
Artillery vs MRLS Resupply Models
The ability to sustain firepower is the cornerstone of modern combat. It depends directly on the security and efficiency of ammunition resupply. Conventional artillery and modern MLRS use different approaches for ammunition design, handling, and resupply doctrine. This creates a significant gap in operational vulnerability and resupply resilience, especially in a peer-level conflict.
Why artillery resupply is highly vulnerable
Fragmented ammunition limits operational tempo
Artillery ammunition consists of separate projectiles, propellant charges, and fuzes. Each shot requires the coordination and assembly of several items. This multipart design is a historical relic. It requires intricate handling and coordination.
During firing and especially during resupply, the crew is most vulnerable. During resupply, the platforms cannot suppress targets, yet remain exposed, stationary, and close to the frontlines. The fragmented nature of ammunition reduces operational tempo and increases the time crews are vulnerable.
Predictable convoys betray artillery positions
Sustained artillery operations require a significant and continuous flow of materiel. This translates to a continuous and substantial volume of resupply military trucks. An individual truck may have a generic signature, but a series of logistics trucks supplying an active artillery unit create a predictable signature. The specific cargo in the trucks may be ambiguous, but their sheer concentration and flow close to frontline is a very strong signal of an active artillery unit.
Adversaries can leverage modern ISR assets to identify and engage the entire logistical chain. Not just individual vehicles, but also the meeting points and ammunition stores. Drones and loitering munitions can efficiently surveil vast stretches of land.
The domino effect of a disrupted supply line
The reliance on this large and often forward-positioned resupply makes artillery exceptionally vulnerable to disruption. And a disruption does not just cause a temporary pause in firing. It triggers a cascade of negative consequences.
Targets can revive and regain strength. Guns run dry and become inert steel, yet they remain vulnerable targets. Adversaries regaining composure further worsen the threat profile.
Further, displacement times for towed artillery is slow. In absence of ammunition or under fire, it becomes a chaotic retreat. Any disuption in ammunition supply catastrophically disrupts operational plans and unit cohesion. Even for self-propelled guns, a resupply interruption forces difficult choices. They can remain in a compromised position and hope for supplies, or they can withdraw and cede ground and momentum.
The psychological impact on crews is profound. Facing dwindling ammunition in a high-threat environment and disrupted resupply creates psychological stress and anxiety. It makes them feel unsafe. This situation is a core element of the death trap concept, as it involves not just physical destruction but also operational paralysis and psychological defeat.
How MLRS Solves the Resupply Problem
In stark contrast, modern MLRS resupply is designed around principles that mitigate many of artillery’s inherent vulnerabilities, emphasizing speed and tempo.
The Speed of Pre-Loaded Rocket Pods
The defining feature of MLRS resupply is the use of pre-loaded, factory-sealed pods/canisters. This design transforms resupply from a laborious, fragmented transfer into a swift, mechanized exchange of large blocks of firepower. A specialized Resupply Vehicle with an integrated crane can reload an MLRS launcher, such as a HIMARS with a six-rocket pod, in 5-10 minutes. This drastically reduces the time the launcher platform must remain static and engaged in resupply.
Decentralized Logistics and the “Shoot-and-Scoot” Advantage
MLRS Resupply Vehicles are specialized and possess a unique signature, making them high-value targets. However, the doctrine tries to mitigate this risk. MLRS doctrine dictates that after expending their munitions, launchers withdraw from forward firing positions to designated Resupply Points (“shoot-and-scoot”).
These points are typically located much further to the rear than artillery ammunition points, and can be transient. These points are frequently rotated over a wide land area. This makes the resupply points harder to identify and engage, especially if they are spread over vast swaths of lands. This minimizes the risk of interception. The challenge for the enemy becomes finding these transient meeting points, or intercepting the resupply vehicles en route over a yet larger area. This is more difficult than finding the consistent, predictable stream of trucks that artillery needs.
Are modern self-propelled guns any better?
While modern self-propelled guns have dramatically improved their own shoot-and-scoot capabilities, they inherit many vulnerabilities of artillery due to similar ammunition. It still requires replenishment with individual shells and propellant charges. This replenishment still involves the manual handling of fragmented ammunition. Resupply must also happen in more forward areas just like towed artillery.
Thus the ammunition still casts a shadow over SPGs. SPGs inherit the same logistical tail of towed artillery. However, their native mobility still makes them far superior over convetional towed artillery. They are much more survivable than towed artillery.
Artillery’s Fatal Platform Flaws
The vulnerabilities inherent in artillery resupply represent a critical flaw. However, artillery faces a much broader suite of the challenges in modern, high-intensity warfare. These are structural platform vulnerabilities, related to the engagement cycle and mobility. When measured against peer adversaries, the crucial metric of “impact per unit of risk” reveals why artillery is often not considered the “cutting edge” of military capability.
The modern battlefield is transparent
The modern battlefield has an unprecedented transparency. Ubiquitous Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) assets feed highly networked command and control systems. This network dramatically compresses sensor-to-shooter timelines, enabling rapid and precise engagement of detected targets.
In such an environment, systems that are slow to react, possess limited agility, or have prolonged periods of “downtime” become prime candidates for swift neutralization. The only platforms that can survive are ones that can deliver decisive effects quickly and maintain operational tempo under contested environments, while minimizing their own risk profile.
‘Death Trap’ in Action: Long emplacement-displacement times
A fundamental vulnerability of traditional artillery is the significant time required to emplace for firing and to displace after an engagement. This process makes the platform very vulnerable and virtually a “sitting duck”. During this entire period, the unit is completely incapable of suppressing targets, self-defense or retreat. Furthermore, modern counter-battery radar can detect firing signatures or emplacement activity. They can immediately cue precision strikes long before the artillery unit can retreat.
‘Death Trap’ in Action: Severly impaired mobility of convetional artillery
Towed artillery relies on a prime mover. Off-road mobility is limited by the capabilities of that vehicle and the nature of the gun itself. The towed nature further limits speed and off-road mobility.
This impaired mobility means that once a firing position is compromised, or a counter-battery fire is anticipated, the ability to rapidly retreat is severely limited. They become, in effect, fixed targets unable to defend itself.
‘Death Trap’ in Action: Artillery firepower lacks the impact of MLRS salvos
Compared to the salvo capabilities of MLRS, an individual artillery tube has a significantly lower salvo size and rate of fire. To achieve a substantial effect, multiple artillery units must be deployed simultaneously for an extended duration. Each minute spent firing directly increases its exposure and risk of counter-battery action.
This contrasts sharply with MLRS, which can deliver an intense salvo of multiple, high-precision rockets. This concentrated burst of firepower maximizes tactical impact achieved with limited exposure.
‘Death Trap’ in Action: The manpower intensity and higher casualty risk
Towed artillery is manpower intensive. It requires larger crews to operate them efficiently. More personnel concentrated around each unit translates into higher potential casualties.
These inherent platform characteristics create a “death trap” scenario even before considering the vulnerabilities of resupply. With the fragile and time-consuming resupply process, the risk to artillery units is compounded exponentially. Artillery becomes increasingly untenable in modern near-peer warfare.
The MLRS Superiority
Defining “impact per risk”
“Impact per unit risk” metric is the lethality of a platform relative to its risk profile. It normalizes the lethality to the risk profile. This is qualitatively defines the “utility” of a platform.
High-Impact Decisive Salvos with High Mobility
Modern MLRS platforms are designed to excel at “impact per risk” metric. The “shoot-and-scoot” doctrine allows them to halt, unleash a devastating salvo in seconds, and immediately displace.
The near-simultaneous arrival of this salvo achieves a powerful tactical effect that is potentially decisive. This is difficult to replicate with slower, sequential artillery fire. The quick emplace-displace times limit the exposure and risk of counter-battery fire. This achieves a high “impact per risk” metric, completely outclassing artillery.
Additionally, the MLRS launcher platforms are very light and typically use wheeled chassis. This offers excellent road speed and good off-road mobility. Rockets are available in a wide variety of physical sizes and guidance/targeting systems. This affords MLRS very wide operational flexibility.
The Complementary Roles of Advanced SPGs and MLRS
Modern, highly advanced Self-Propelled Guns (SPGs) represent a revolution in artillery. Their mobility drastically reduces emplacement-displacement times. Many advanced SPGs feature Multiple Rounds Simultaneous Impact (MRSI) capability, which enables a single gun to achieve near-simultaneous impact of multiple shells. While this cannot match the salvo size of MLRS, it is an approximation to MLRS salvos.
Ultimately, advanced SPGs and MLRS serve distinct but complementary purposes on the battlefield. SPGs excel at delivering precise, sustained, and cost-effective fire. In contrast, the massive, concentrated strikes of a MLRS provide an unparalleled ability to deliver decisive outcomes. The choice between them depends on the specific tactical requirements of the mission.
Conclusion: The Shift to an MLRS-Dominated Firepower Doctrine
The cutting edge in peer conflict is defined by decisive effects delivered with maximum impact and minimal exposure. This requires a resilient logistical framework. Traditional artillery fails to meet this standard. It is a death trap.
Artillery’s operational characteristics cannot match the tempo and lethality of the modern battlespace. Its reaction times are slow. Its firing and displacement cycles require prolonged exposure. Its tactical agility is limited. These factors create an unacceptable risk-to-impact ratio. The problem is fatal because its resupply process is fragile and time-consuming.
Modern MLRS provides a superior model for survivability and effectiveness. Its design enables rapid “shoot-and-scoot” precision salvos. It maximizes tactical impact within minimal exposure windows. Advanced Self-Propelled Guns are an improvement, but they still face greater constraints. They cannot match the concentration of effect per unit of risk that MLRS provides. Their resupply is also more complex.
The new doctrine for land-based fire support is defined by speed, precision, and logistical efficiency. This paradigm shift pushes conventional artillery from the forefront of high-intensity combat. For artillery to remain relevant, its fundamental operational and logistical vulnerabilities must be radically overcome.